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I. Introduction
Iraqi Tribunal Officials are attempting to establish judicial legitimacy and 
maintain legal order, while insurgents are threatening the lives of tribunal judges 
and lawyers.  Iraqi Judge Barwes Mohammed Mahmoud al-Merwani was killed in 
a drive-by-shooting along with his son, lawyer Aryan Barwez al-Merwani on 
March 1, 2005.1  Family members of the slain men think they were assisinated by 
insurgents because the judge and his lawyer son were both minority Kurds working 
for the court.2  This constant threat to tribunal officials raises major obstacles in 
continuing to try Iraqi War Criminals in this hostile environment on Iraqi soil.  
Tribunal officials put a great deal of thought in assessing where to set up a 
tribunal to try Hussein and members of his Baathist regime.  In April 2004, the 
Iraqi National Congress formed a war crime tribunal made up of Iraqi judges and 
Iraqi prosecutors, in order to try Hussein and other members of his Baathist regime 
in Iraq.  Prior to the establishment of the New Iraq Tribunal, founders visited the 
International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands to research the complex 
procedural issues of trying high-profile subject like Hussein.  The founders 
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2researched the structure of other international tribunals and met with experts from 
tribunals in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the former Yugoslavia.3
Through advanced study and analysis of other international tribunals, the Iraqi 
Court founders evaluated which aspects to employ in their emerging court system.    
The Iraqi National Congress wants the new Iraqi Tribunal to be a purely domestic 
court, but will combine international regulations with domestic criminal laws and 
experiences from international tribunals.4  The goal is that Iraqis will ultimately 
run this new court, as they learn how to put a judiciary system together.5
Iraqi Tribunal officials evaluated three international tribunal models to 
determine it’s’ formation, procedural development, and legitimacy: (1) the ad hoc 
ICTY and ICTR models, (2) the International Criminal Court, and (3) the hybrid 
model.  By researching the different International Tribunals, the founders of the 
Iraqi court evaluated the structure, procedure, location, and enforcement power of 
the existing tribunals, and applied the positive methods to the new Iraqi Tribunal.    
II.  Historical Context
International Criminal law represents a particularly fertile area of institutional 
expansion.6  Genocide and war crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction under 
the fundamental principles of international common law.  According to 
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3international law, such crimes may be punished by any state because the offenders 
are common enemies of all mankind and all national have equal interest in their 
apprehension and punishment.7  When crimes against humanity were charged 
against a nation state, customary international policy dictated the formation of an
International Military Tribunal or an International Tribunal located in the Locus 
Delicti, “place of the wrong.”8  At the present time, however, ad-hoc and hybrid 
tribunals are established in a variety of locations.  Some are located in the “place 
of the wrong,” while others exist in neighboring states or in a centrally devised 
international location such as The Hague, Netherlands.  
The development of International Courts formed in order to enforce the jus 
cogens rules of international morality, those crimes against humanity that are 
manifestly illegal under international law.9  By definition jus cogens is Latin for 
“compelling law” and is a mandatory norm of general international law which no 
two or more nations may exempt themselves or release one another.10  Violations 
of human rights such as genocide, slavery and torture are considered jus cogens
rules.  
In the aftermath of The Great War (World War I), an era of international 
creativity and reformation commenced and the Permanency Court of International
Justice (PCIJ) was established.  It was formed by the League of Nations and 
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4located at the Peace Palace at The Hague, Netherlands.11  “The PCIJ marked a 
qualitative change in the settlement of inter-State disputes in that its composition 
and its procedures were not under the control of the disputant States.12  The PCIJ 
fell simultaneously with the League of Nations at the start of World War II.  But, it 
revived “another guise” subsequently as part of the United Nations.13
Following World War II, the international community outraged at the atrocities 
committed by the Nazi regime, took action by holding the Nuremberg Trials and 
tried many leaders who were responsible for egregious violations.14    The 
Nuremberg trials established a basic framework and precedent for the prosecution 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity and condemned a war of aggression in 
the strongest terms. 15 To initiate a war of aggression… is not only an international 
crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in 
that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.  
Nuremberg held individuals accountable for crimes against peace, defined as 
the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in 
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a 
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.16
In addition, another Tribunal was created in the Far East.  These two 
International Military Tribunals “were made up of rules of procedure tailored to 
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5that tribunal, and differed markedly from most National procedural systems, 
probably being a composite of several systems.”17  Evidence from these military 
tribunals was not technically bound; instead any evidence of probative value was 
admitted.18  In addition, the jurisdiction was expanded and the courts consisted of 
multinational characters but were located in a domestic setting.  
As early as 1946, the United Nations General Assembly overwhelmingly 
affirmed the principles of international law recognized by the Charter and 
Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal (The Nuremberg principles).  In 1948, it 
adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, which “defined genocide and proclaimed it a crime against international 
law.19  “In this wave of remorse and idealism, the United Nations and its charter 
are now considered the foundation for international human rights law.”20  It was in 
the resolution adopting that Convention that the United Nations General Assembly 
first considered the establishment of an international criminal court.21
The Geneva Conventions of 1949, not only codified and expanded the rules of 
war, but also included basic protections for civilians.22  The Conventions contained
common articles regarding grave breaches, which in effect constitute war crimes or 
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6crimes against humanity.  Under these articles, states are obligated to search for 
persons who commit grave breaches and bring them to trial regardless of their 
sovereign links.23
As a result of the Geneva Conventions and the movement for resolution of 
international conflicts, the United States adopted the concept of Universal 
Jurisdiction.  Under customary international law principles, a state has jurisdiction 
to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the 
community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks 
on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of 
terrorism.24  Universal jurisdiction over the specified offenses is a result of 
universal condemnation of those activities and general interest in cooperating to 
suppress them, as reflected in widely accepted international agreements and 
resolutions of international organizations.25
The suffering and atrocities that took place in the course of the conflicts of the 
1990s stimulated a series of far-reaching responses by the international 
community, including collective humanitarian interventions and the subsequent 
creation of the temporary entitles International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda 
(ICTR) and the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) by the United Nations Security Council 
and NATO respectively.26  This intervention by the International Community 
23See Yvonne C. Lodico, The Justifications for Humanitarian Intervention: Will the Continent Matter?, 35 Int’l 
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7began an ascendance that went beyond territorial borders and sovereign abuses 
therein,27 and international courts made up of international and domestic judges, to 
lay a foundation for grave abuses of human rights violations.  In this regard, 
international organizations and states have gained more responsibility toward 
protecting lives and toward delivering humanitarian assistance, even through 
military means.28
The formation of these new ad-hoc tribunals was costly and time consuming.  
United Nations officials began to realize that tribunals established after the fact are 
typically bound by mandates that are specific in time and place.29  The need for a 
permanent International Court was forthcoming, as temporary tribunals like the 
ICTY and ICTR were challenging, lengthy and expensive undertakings.  The 
United Nations began to look into the possibility of forming a treaty-based 
permanent international court.
Therefore in July 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, 
Netherlands was established, through a treaty of nations.  The ICC aims through a 
mandate to bring to justice individuals responsible for the world’s most serious 
crimes, atrocities and mass murders in an efficient and effective manner.30  The 
ICC has jurisdiction over member states, without a special mandate from the 
efforts of the international community to control international conflicts through the formation of the ICTR, ICTY, 
and the ICC).
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8United Nations Security Council.31  The intent of this international judiciary is to 
deter war criminals, and is established as an independent entity.32
Although the ICC has no cases in its books, the new investigatory power of 
this global court is beginning to raise awareness and gain recognition in order to 
“tackle the world’s gravest of crimes.”33  In December 2003, the President of 
Uganda referred the tumultuous situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army 
to the ICC Prosecutor.  The first investigation of the International Criminal Court 
is now underway in an attempt to uncover violations of international law and 
custom in Uganda.34  This particular method of discovery could assist nations who 
do not have internal intelligence agencies at their disposal, in order to uncover 
evidence regarding crimes on humanity.  Most recently, in April 2004, the 
President Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo asked for the 
ICC to investigate possible war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity 
stemming from their civil war, which killed around three million people.35
In addition, nations with struggling or non-existent judiciary systems have 
reached out to the United Nations, after witnessing the formation of the Ad-Hoc 
tribunals of the ICTY and the ICTR.  As a result, need-based hybrid tribunals were 
recently set up by the United Nations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and 
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9Cambodia.  These institutions blend international and domestic laws, and are set up 
with the help of the United Nations, to provide a justice where a Baathist run court 
system existed.  After the Baathist party came to power in 1968, the judiciary 
ended separation of powers, and civilian courts became subservient to military 
courts.36  The court system was then comprised of military courts, religious courts, 
revolutionary courts and special courts.  In revolutionary courts, no appellate level 
existed.37
The goal to form a new Iraqi Court was announced in April 2004, to try the 
Baathist regime leaders and former Iraqi leader Sadaam Hussein.  The Iraqi Court 
is comprised of a panel of seven Iraqi judges and four Iraqi prosecutors.  There 
have been serious doubts that the special tribunal will meet international standards, 
primarily because the judges are not familiar with international law.38  The United 
States has sent a small group to assist Iraqi investigators and judges, however they 
are not going to be running the process.39  The international tribunal models of the 
ICC, ICTY, ICTR, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the former Yugoslavia; will 
surely influence the direction of the new Iraqi Tribunal.  Yet continued violence 
against the new tribunal may not only inhibit the legal function and effectiveness 
of the Court, but will surely deter some judges and lawyers from wanting to 
participate in the legal process when their lives are at stake.           
36 http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr104html
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III. Legal Analysis
A.  Ad Hoc Tribunals
a. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia celebrated its 
tenth anniversary last year.40  In the past decade, the ICTY ad hoc tribunal has 
created more legal precedent than all the previous international and domestic war 
crimes cases combined.41  But, there is also sharp criticism regarding efficiency, 
legitimacy, and local.
The framework of the court system in the former Yugoslavia is vast and 
there are several legal institutions adjudicating the atrocities stemming from crimes 
against humanity.  The International Court of Justice, national courts, and a hybrid 
tribunal also help to play a part of this seemingly, “institutional constellation in the 
former Yugoslavia.”42  The ICJ deals with reparative claims involving state 
responsibility while national courts are involved in civil and criminal litigation.43
Additionally, a hybrid overflow tribunal was created to handle the backlog of cases 
from the ICTY, and is located in Kosovo.  Since such a “diverse array of 
40 See Mark A. Drumbl, Looking Up, Down and Across:  The ICTY’s Place in the International Legal Order, 
Washington & Lee Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, n.702 (May 2003).
41 See Mark A. Drumbl, Looking Up, Down and Across:  The ICTY’s Place in the International Legal Order, 
Washington & Lee Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, n.702 (May 2003, See also, Conference 
Program: “The ICTY at Ten,” at the New England School of Law in Boston, Mass. (Nov. 9, 2002)(on file with the 
New England Center for International law and policy).
42 See Mark A. Drumbl, Looking Up, Down and Across:  The ICTY’s Place in the International Legal Order, 
Washington & Lee Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, n.707 (May 2003).
43 See Mark A. Drumbl, Looking Up, Down and Across:  The ICTY’s Place in the International Legal Order, 
Washington & Lee Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, n.707 (May 2003).
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institutions” are involved, a number of jurisdictional co-existence rules have 
developed as a result.44
“Several rules have been developed regarding the relationship of the ICTY 
with local and national institutions when it comes to the adjudication of individual 
criminal responsibility for mass atrocity in the former Yugoslavia.”45  International 
tribunals have jurisdictional primacy over national or local courts in criminal 
adjudication of mass atrocities.46  ICTY now has primacy of over national courts, 
but no person may be tried before a national court, if that person already has been 
tried by the ICTY.  Rules of evidence are also affected by the multi-layered 
national and international court infrastructure.  Under the ICTY Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence Rule 12, any state determination is not binding upon the ICTY.  “As 
such, the ICTY is not compelled to follow national decisions regarding important 
legal findings (for example the existence of genocide in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina).”47
When criminals of the former territory of Yugoslavia were tried for crimes 
against humanity in an International Tribunal, numerous jurisdictional objections 
arose as to whether the tribunal had subject-matter jurisdiction over offenses, 
which constituted International Conflict.48  Yugoslavia was charged with the 
44 See Mark A. Drumbl, Looking Up, Down and Across:  The ICTY’s Place in the International Legal Order, 
Washington & Lee Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, n.707 (May 2003).
45 See Mark A. Drumbl, Looking Up, Down and Across:  The ICTY’s Place in the International Legal Order, 
Washington & Lee Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, n.707 (May 2003).
46 See Mark A. Drumbl, Looking Up, Down and Across:  The ICTY’s Place in the International Legal Order, 
Washington & Lee Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, n.707 (May 2003).
47 See Mark A. Drumbl, Looking Up, Down and Across:  The ICTY’s Place in the International Legal Order, 
Washington & Lee Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, n.707 (May 2003).
48 See 1 BHRC 479 (1996).
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violation of international humanitarian law, and former leaders of the territory 
were prosecuted for grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  An 
indictment was issued against the commander of the Bosnian Croat forces in 
response to the following violated conventions: 
(a) Willful killing; (d) extensive destruction and appropriation of 
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out 
unlawfully and wantonly; violations of the laws and customs of 
war, as recognized by article 3.49
In addition, the International Court of Justice also tried the former Yugoslavia for
violations against the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.50
Bosnia and Herzegovina wanted to hold Yugoslavia accountable for breach 
of its obligations under general and customary international law, as well as 
obligations under the United Nations Charter.51  The basis for the International 
Court’s jurisdiction is grounded in the Customary and Conventional International 
Laws of War and International Humanitarian Law, but was also formed according 
to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Charter, The Hague Regulations 
on Land Warfare of 1907, and the Nuremberg Charter, Judgment, and Principles.52
The ICTY was established at The Hague, far removed from the scene of the 
atrocities, and the court is comprised of International judges and staff.53  With that 
49 See 1 BHRC 479 (1996).
50 See 1993 I.C.J 325, 327.
51 See 1993 I.C.J 325, 327.
52 See Id at 341.
53 See Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, The American Journal of International Law, 97 A.J.I.L. 
295, 301-303 (April 2003).
13
said, the lack of perceived legitimacy and connection to the local population is a 
root of many problems centered in the ICTY:  
“A recent empirical study of the perceptions of the ICTY within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina indicates that a wide cross-section of lawyers and judges from 
all ethnic groups, while playing a different roles within Bosnian society, 
were similarly ill-informed about the ICTY’s work, and were often 
suspicious of its motives and its results.”54
The ICTY is centered in The Hague but also does work in Bosnia.  However, the 
failure of the ICTY to publicize its Bosnia connection and the lack of local 
participation attributes to a lack of perceived legitimacy.55  Critics maintain that a 
“purely international process that bypasses the local population does little to help 
improve the capacity of the local population to establish its own justice system.”56
“An international court staffed by foreigners, or even a local justice system 
operated exclusively by the UN transitional administration, cannot hope to train 
local actors in necessary skills.”57
Despite all the criticisms regarding jurisdictional scope and legitimacy, the 
ICTY has set forth precedent in International law.  On April 19, 2004, the ICTY 
ruled on an extended definition of “genocide.58”  The term genocide as set forth by 
the ICTY encompasses: 
54 See Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, The American Journal of International Law, 97 A.J.I.L. 
n.295, 301-303 (April 2003).
55 See Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, The American Journal of International Law, 97 A.J.I.L. 
n.295, 303 (April 2003) at page 5.
56 See Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, The American Journal of International Law, 97 A.J.I.L. 
n.295, 303 (April 2003).
57 See Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, The American Journal of International Law, 97 A.J.I.L. 
n.295, 304 (April 2003).
58 www.un.org/icty/latest/latestnewsmain-e.htm
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“Those who devise and implement genocide seek to deprive humanity of the 
manifold richness its nationalities, races, ethnicities and religions provide.  
This is a crime against all humankind, its harm being felt not only by the 
group targeted for destruction, but by all humanity.”  
The ICTY Appeals chamber unanimously found that “genocide was committed in 
Srebrenica in 1995.”59  This recent ruling will send rippling effects to other 
international tribunals and domestic tribunals who follow international law, and set 
the stage for trials concerning genocide and crimes against humanity in the future.  
b. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
The United Nations Security Council Chapter VII Resolution established a 
temporary entity, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1994, after 
recognizing that serious violations of humanitarian law were committed.60
Rwandan President Paul Kagame, painted a cryptic picture of crimes against 
humanity, describing the genocide of almost 1 million people in 1994 as, “the most 
brutal and fastest massive killing in world history.”61  President Kagame says 
Rwanda seeks reparations and, “to forgive, but not forget; to bury the dead, but not 
spirits; and to bring forth justice and reconciliation.”62
Since it’s inception, the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
delivered the first ever judgment on the crime of genocide by an international 
court.  The ICTR has encountered obstacles much like it’s counterpart the ICTY.  
59 www.un.org/icty/latest/latestnewsmain-e.htm
60 www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/geninfo/intor.htm
61
 President of the Republic of Rwanda Paul Kagame, Address at the University of Denver (Apr. 14, 2004).
62
 President of the Republic of Rwanda Paul Kagame, Address at the University of Denver (Apr. 14, 2004)
15
However, The ICTR faces even greater problems due to the lack local support, 
inefficiency, inequity, leniency and distant location hindrances.  
The Rwandan government itself is critical of the ICTR, as they have a seat 
on the UN Security Council and originally voted against the formation of the 
tribunal.63  The ad hoc tribunal for Rwanda is located in the neighboring country of 
Tanzania, and the seat of the council is set up in Arusha.  This creates difficulties 
in obtaining evidence, as travel is difficult for witnesses and guarantees “further 
intractable delays.”64
The ICTR proceedings, which adhere to the “Western Rules of the Law,” are 
criticized as slow, expensive and unduly selective.65  The subject matter of the
ICTR is broad, and encompasses violations of international humanitarian law, 
which are also part of customary international law.66  An American Judge, David 
M. Ebel, helped set up the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is 
discouraged by it’s performance:
“It is a bloated an inefficient Tribunal that has squandered staggering 
amounts of money and valuable time.  Had the budget of the ICTR been 
allocated to the Country of Rwanda, they could have tried the 120,000 
prisoners that have been held in Rwandan prisons for more than 10 years.  
Instead, the ICTR has manages only a handful of trials to date.”67
63 See Mark A. Drumbl, Lessons for International Criminal Justice from Rwanda, Washington & Lee Public Law 
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The structure of the ICTR consists of three organs; the Chambers and Appeals 
Chamber; the Office of the Prosecutor, in charge of investigations and 
prosecutions; and the Registry, responsible for providing overall judicial and 
administrative support to the Chambers and the Prosecutor.68
The ICTR is composed exclusively of international judges elected by the 
United Nations General Assembly, and a Prosecutor selected by the Security 
Council.69  The judges are elected by the United Nations General Assembly, and 
are submitted by the Security Council.70  They are initially selected from a list 
submitted by Member States of the United Nations.  The judges are elected for a 
four-year term, and no two judges may be nationals of the same state.71
The International mixture of judges can further complicate the structure if 
the ICTR, “because each of the judges is of a different nationality and comes from 
different traditions.72”  In addition, an internationally equitable pay scale can create 
an incentive for some to work slowly and collect high pay: 
“The U.N. has a pay scale that tries to compensate everyone equally 
according to the private pay scale of the highest employee.  Because some of 
the judges are from the United States or Europe, where pay is high, that 
means that extraordinarily high pay is also given to the judges from the 
underdeveloped countries.  The pay scale for those from underdeveloped 
regions is so unrealistic compared to local economic conditions that the local 
68 www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/geninfo/ictrlaw.htm
69 See Michael P. Scharf, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, The American Society of International Law, available 
at www.asil.org/insights/insigh53.htm at page 2.
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71 www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/geninfo/structure.htm
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prosecutors, defenders and judges have every incentive to turn this 
appointment into a life-time job.”73
Therefore, the differences in language, custom and pay lead to an inequity among 
judges and perpetrate an unduly slow process at the ICTR.
Furthermore, the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda is criticized as 
being less strict on those convicted than are the customary Rwandan domestic 
courts.  There is a lot of tension between the government of Rwanda and the ICTR, 
because Rwanda believes that the ICTR has intermingled in its affairs by grabbing 
prominent and culpable criminals and “providing them with an easier forum where 
they are guaranteed not to get the death penalty.”74  The ICTR has custody over 
those who masterminded the genocide of the Rwandan people, and may not issue a 
death sentence.75  As a result, many Rwandan citizens feel that the court 
emphasizes the rights of the accused, and does not give enough respect to the rights 
of the victims.76  In contrast, domestic Rwandan courts can issue death sentences to 
less notorious criminals, and have issued death sentences to 20 percent of their 
criminals.77
The ICTR faces staunch criticism as being inefficient and slow, and has 
faced tension from the government of Rwanda regarding jurisdictional matters and 
73
 Email from Honorable David M. Ebel, Judge at the Byron White U.S. Courthouse, to Melissa Dougherty, 
International Law Student, University of Denver College of Law (Apr. 21, 2004).
74
 Email from Honorable David M. Ebel, Judge at the Byron White U.S. Courthouse, to Melissa Dougherty, 
International Law Student, University of Denver College of Law (Apr. 21, 2004).
75 See Mark A. Drumbl, Lessons for International Criminal Justice from Rwanda, Washington & Lee Public Law 
Research Paper No. 02-13, n.3 (2002).
76 See Mark A. Drumbl, Lessons for International Criminal Justice from Rwanda, Washington & Lee Public Law 
Research Paper No. 02-13, n.3 (2002).
77 See Mark A. Drumbl, Lessons for International Criminal Justice from Rwanda, Washington & Lee Public Law 
Research Paper No. 02-13, n.3 (2002).
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the inability to apply the death penalty.  But, despite such tension and discord the 
International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda has raised awareness of the human 
rights violations, created a permanent record, and convicted numerous individuals 
for crimes of genocide:78
“The ICTR had also given critical international legitimacy to the trial 
of some of the leading perpetrators of the genocide.  It has established 
two very important legal precedents: first, that rape can be an 
instrument of genocide.  Secondly, that private citizens who do not 
directly participate in the genocide and who have no official 
responsibilities for the genocide, can nevertheless be held accountable 
for the genocide if the encourage and otherwise indirectly aid and abet 
the genocide.  These legal principles, by themselves are probably 
worth the enormous budget of the ICTR.  It has provided a forum for 
international jurisdiction to obtain perpetrators who have fled across 
the globe.  Some of the apprehending countries probably would not 
have extradited their prisoners back to Rwanda although they were 
willing to extradite to the ICTR.”79
Therefore, the Rwanda Tribunal laid down important international legal 
precedents, amidst all the difficulties of structure and procedure.  
The ICTR is somewhat of a “mixed bag” as it has laid a foundation for 
justice in Rwanda, though encountering serious delays and structural problems.80
As a result of those expensive and lengthy proceedings of the ad hoc tribunals of 
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and in an effort to reform the international 
court system, the United Nations took steps towards forming a treaty to develop a 
permanent International Criminal Court. 
78 See Mark A. Drumbl, Lessons for International Criminal Justice from Rwanda, Washington & Lee Public Law 
Research Paper No. 02-13 n.2-3 (2002).
79
 Email from Honorable David M. Ebel, Judge at the Byron White U.S. Courthouse, to Melissa Dougherty, 
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B. International Criminal Court
In July 1998 in Rome, Italy, 120 member states of the United Nations 
formed a treaty and established the International Criminal Court.81  The permanent 
international court had jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and the crime of aggression.82  Four years later, sixty nation states became 
parties to the Rome Statute through ratification or accession.83  These parties have 
consented to jurisdiction at the ICC.  The Rome Charter of the ICC is the first ever 
treaty based, international criminal court established to promote the role of 
international law and to ensure the gravest crimes do not go unpunished.84
The ICC (much like the ICTY and ICTR) has also encountered opposition 
due to sovereign notions, lack of enforcement, centralized location efficiency, and 
its euro-centric death penalty stance.  
In an effort to preserve internal sovereignty, the United States did not sign 
the Rome Charter.  The United States voted against the Rome Statute, concluding 
that it could pose an unacceptable risk to the U.S. military personnel and to the 
ability of commander in chief to deploy forces worldwide to protect the United 
States and global interests.85  The United States looked at globalization as a 
transformation of the world economy, and also an alteration of the competence of 
81 www.un.org/News/facts/icc.fact.htm
82 www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr22/cfr22.html
83 www.un.org/News/facts/icc.fact.htm
84 See, e.g., United Nations Department of Public Information, Crimes within the Court’s Jurisdiction available at 
www.un.org/icc/crimes.htm, at 1.
85 www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr22/cfr22.html
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sovereignty and of the principle of the nation state being the principal center of 
power.86  “Some now argue that, on balance, any such court (ICC) would disserve 
American interests.  Others contend that with the (ICC) court becoming a reality, 
the costs of not joining far outweigh the costs of joining.”87  In any event, by 
voting against the Rome Statute, the United States refused to accept jurisdiction 
under the International Criminal Court.
The courts jurisdiction is limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community.  It has jurisdiction of member states with respect to the 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.88  The ICC intends to 
be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions, but does not aim to 
replace national courts.  The court will only investigate and prosecute matters 
when a state is unable or disinclined to do their legal duties.89
 In addition to statutory international law, the ICC also takes violations of 
customary international law into account.  The list of customs applicable in 
international armed conflicts enumerates the following criminal acts:
o Targeting civilians
o Targeting buildings devoted to art or science;
o Killing combatants who have laid down their arms and 
surrendered
86 See Yvonne C. Lodico, The Justifications for Humanitarian Intervention: Will the Continent Matter? 35 Int’l 
Law, n.1027, 1037 (2001).
87 www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr22/cfr22.html
88See, e.g., United Nations Department of Public Information, Crimes within the Court’s Jurisdiction available at 
www.un.org/icc/crimes.htm, at 1.
89 www.icc-cpi.int/php/show.php?id=gi_icc
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o Declaring that no quarter will be given
o Pillaging
o Using a flag or truce or other flag or insignia falsely, resulting 
in death or serious injury
o Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, enforced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and other forms of sexual 
violence
o Intentional starvation of civilians as a method of warfare
Proposals have been made to include poisoned weapons, gas weapons, 
chemical weapons, bacteriological weapons, and nuclear weapons.90  Until these 
weapons proposals are instilled in ICC law, it might be difficult to show a violation 
of customary international law regarding weapons of mass destruction or chemical 
weapons by Sadaam Hussein or leaders of the former Iraqi government.   
Evidence of violations of Geneva Accords, the Rome Statute of the ICC, 
crimes against United Nations Personnel, international treaties, or customary 
international law can be initiated through an investigation authorized by a Pre-Trial 
Chamber as a means of “international discovery.”91  This international method of 
obtaining evidence of crimes against humanity is paving the way for international 
procedural discovery.  
90 See, e.g., United Nations Department of Public Information, Crimes within the Court’s Jurisdiction available at 
www.un.org/icc/crimes.htm, at 4.
91 See, e.g., United Nations Department of Public Information, Crimes within the Court’s Jurisdiction available at 
www.un.org/icc/crimes.htm, at 2.
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There is much criticism concerning the ICC’s ability to enforce International 
judgments.  A considerable body of international law exists to protect civilians 
during internal armed conflict.92  The main problem lies not in the content of those 
rules, but rather in their enforcement.93  In the past in cohesive resolutions made by 
the United Nations Security Council, the ICC, and national governments in the 
international arena have carried little weight, since they are unable to be enforced 
and carried out.  Measures which might facilitate enforcement are: criminal 
prosecution of violators by national courts and international tribunals; belligerent 
reprisals; dissemination of humanitarian law; measures by other governments 
(including the use of force); measures by the International Red Cross, the United 
Nations and other international entities; and action by regional human right bodies.  
The signs are hopeful that the international community is beginning to face up to 
its responsibilities as regards to the enforcement of international law – largely on 
the basis of the creation of the ICTR, ICTY, and the ICC.94
The ICC is under scrutiny by those favoring a hybrid model as being too 
remote.  The ICC holds trials in The Hague, Netherlands rather than in the location 
where the crimes occurred:
“Because the work of the international courts is physically remote from the 
countries in question, and the judges and personnel have not been drawn 
92 Compare Michael J. Matheson, 97 A.J.I.L. n.468 (2003), and LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL 
ARMED CONFLICT, n.232 (2003) (emphasizing the lack of treatment regarding a fundamental impact on 
development due to conflicts through the formation of the ICTR, ICTY, and the ICC).
93 Compare Michael J. Matheson, 97 A.J.I.L. n.468 (2003), and LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL 
ARMED CONFLICT, n.232 (2003) (emphasizing the lack of treatment regarding a fundamental impact on 
development due to conflicts through the formation of the ICTR, ICTY, and the ICC).
94Compare Michael J. Matheson, 97 A.J.I.L. 468, (2003), and LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL 
ARMED CONFLICT, 277 (2003) (emphasizing the lack of treatment regarding a fundamental impact on 
development due to conflicts through the formation of the ICTR, ICTY, and the ICC).
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from the local population, there is little opportunity for domestic legal 
professionals to absorb, apply, interpret, critique, and develop international 
norms.  The mere existence of an international court does not create a 
channel for its jurisprudence to be used and developed, or even merely 
respected and understood on a local level.”95
The remote location of the ICC can hinder witnesses, delay proceedings, and create 
unduly expensive trials.
In addition, the International Criminal Courts cannot sentence violators of 
gross international crimes to death.  Widely disapproved in international custom, 
the death penalty is also restricted in Article 4 of the American Convention of 
Human Rights recognizes the right to life and restricts the application of the death 
penalty.   One exception is the reservation is set forth in Article 2 allows the death 
penalty for extremely serious wartime crimes of a military nature. 96  Unless war 
crimes of a grievous nature take place, then the international community will not 
advocate the death penalty.  Some nations, who apply the death penalty, may not 
want to submit their membership to the ICC, because of perceived leniency.
The ICC is a separate entity from the United Nations, and is funded by from 
states contributions, voluntary contributions from governments, international 
organizations, individuals, and corporations.97  The International Criminal Court 
has developed a permanent court structure to “handle the world’s most serious 
crimes, atrocities and mass murders.”98  For years to come, the ICC will build upon 
95 See Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, The American Journal of International Law, 97 A.J.I.L. 
n. 295, 305(April 2003).
96
 29 I.L.M. 1447-1448 (1990)
97 www.un.org/News/facts/iccfact.htm
98 www.un.org/News/facts/icc.fact.htm
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its successes and failures to improve the international forum for crimes of universal 
proportion.  
B. Hybrid Model – UN Helping Domestic Arena
The Hybrid Model is an intermediary between the ad-hoc tribunals (ICTY, 
ICTR, ICC) and a purely domestic tribunal.  Hybrid models can change  
“considerably depending on the unique circumstances of each case.”99  The 
proponents of the hybrid model feel that, “there are no cookie-cutter solutions to 
the highly complex issues of confronting past atrocities.”100
A hybrid model was set up in Kosovo by the United Nations, in order to 
relieve a backlog of human rights cases from the International Courts for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) International Tribunal.  In East Timor and Sierra 
Leone, the hybrid model was employed where no politically viable full-fledged 
international tribunal previously existed.   Additionally, a hybrid model is currently 
under negotiation in Cambodia.101 In order to carry out their mission, the hybrid 
courts need to rely on international cooperation and judicial assistance by states 
and international organizations.102
Hybrid Courts have attracted little attention, while standing in the shadows 
of the ICC.  The hybrid model is criticized as only providing a temporary solution 
99 See Laura A. Dickenson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, 
n.306 (2003).
100 See Laura A. Dickenson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, 
n.306 (2003).
101
 See Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, n.295 
(2003).
102 http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/hybrid.html
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for adjudication, and since the hybrid model is not a permanent international court, 
critics content: 
“That hybrid courts like those of East Timor and Sierra Leone arose only 
because of “tribunal fatigue” and that the existence of an international 
tribunal with applicable jurisdiction would have made the hybrid tribunals 
unnecessary.”103
Another criticism arises regarding the ultimate goal of judicial independence in 
countries, which would rather instill a permanent judicial system, and are looking 
towards future stability, not just temporary solutions.
Conversely, the hybrid model is also considered a newly emerging form of 
accountability and reconciliation, is a blend of the ICC and a domestic military 
tribunal.104
Proponents feel the hybrid court maintains a balance, as both the 
institutional apparatus and the applicable law consist of a blend of the international 
and the domestic and is set up by the United Nations.105  The hybrid model is 
generally utilized in post-conflict settings and is mixture of domestic and 
international structure and procedure.  Hybrid courts are made up of domestic and 
foreign judges, and tried by local prosecution and defense teams.  Domestic law is 
103
 See Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, n.295, 
307 (2003). 
104 See Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, n.295 
(2003). 
105 See Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, n.295 
(2003).
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reformed to accord with international standards, and the courts are conceived in an 
ad hoc way.106
This blend strikes up controversy from those critical to the ICC, such as the 
Bush Administration.  The hybrid model may be seen as too close to the formal 
international courts, and too far from the domestic war crimes tribunal.  The hybrid 
model is seemingly a balancing-act between domestic and international infusion, 
and the goal is to attain a balance in a locale where not other feasible judiciary 
exists.   
a. Kosovo (overflow)
The United Nations established a hybrid court in Kosovo to deal with a 
backlog of the many egregious human rights cases overflowing from the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).  The ICTY 
only had enough resources to try only those who had committed the worst 
atrocities on the widest scale, and needed to pass off some of the human rights 
violations and war crimes cases to the hybrid court.107   The legal infrastructure of 
Kosovo was virtually non-existent, as the law libraries and courts were ravaged 
during the years of conflict between the Serbians and Albanians.108  There were 
106 See Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, n.295, 
296 (2003).
107 See Laura Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, n.295, 297 
(2003).
108 See Laura Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, n.295, 297 
(2003).
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shortages of local lawyers and judges as Albanians were barred from judiciary for 
many years, and the Serbian judges and lawyers fled or refused to serve.109
To deal with the sparse legal resources, a mixture of international and 
domestic lawyers and judges serve the hybrid courts.110  The war-crimes trials were 
held in courts with a majority of international judges and prosecutors.111  Judges 
applied substantive law that was also a blend of international and domestic.
In addition, local law was only applied when it followed the “international human 
rights norms.”112
b. East Timor 
The United Nations responded to a security crisis in East Timor by sending 
in an Australian peacekeeping force to restore order in September 1999.113  The 
United Nations later established a hybrid court in East Timor, where the local legal 
infrastructure was in even greater disarray than in Kosovo.  As a result of the 
militia rampage and violence, shelter and supplies were difficult to obtain.114
109 See Laura Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, n.295, 296 
(2003); Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 7, at n.49-50, 53.
110 See Laura Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, n.295, 297 
(2003).
111
 See Laura Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, n.295, 298 
(2003)
112 See Laura Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, n.295, 297 
(2003).
113 See Ruth Wedgewood, East Timor and the United Nations, Columia International Affairs Online Curriculum 
Modules, n.5, August 2001.
114 See Ruth Wedgewood, East Timor and the United Nations, Columia International Affairs Online Curriculum 
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There were few trained lawyers, and the “militia members suspected of committing 
mass atrocities were being held in makeshift prison facilities.”115
Serious crimes such as, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, 
murder, and sexual offenses were held before panels of three judges.  The panel 
was made up of one East-Timorese judge and two International judges.116  This 
was a historic concept because, “never before have East-Timorese judges sat in 
judgment of their fellow people, and never before have East Timorese prosecutors 
and defense lawyers appears as professionals in their own land.”117  Now that East-
Timor has gained independence from Indonesia, the hybrid system will continue to 
play a significant role in finding accountability for human rights abuses.  However, 
this hybrid court is having problems because of the lack of funding and personnel 
at the present time.118
c. Sierra Leone
Soon after a peace agreement in Sierra Leone was reached in July 1999, 
rebels resumed attacks in Sierra Leone.119  The resurgence of attacks prompted the 
government of this West African country to ask the United Nations to establish an 
international court to prosecute those responsible for war crimes during their civil 
115 See Laura Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, n.295, 298 
(2003).
116 See Laura Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, n.295, 298 
(2003).
117
 See, Suzannah Linton, Prosecuting Atrocities at the District Court of Dill, Melbourne Journal of International 
Law, n.2 (Dec. 2001)
118 See Laura Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, n.295, 299 
(2003).
119 See Michael P. Scharf, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, The American Society of International Law, available 
at www.asil.org/insights/insigh53.htm at page 1.
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war.120  The Security Council asked the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
Kofi Annan, to make a blueprint for an independent special court whose subject 
matter included “crimes against humanity, war crimes and other violations of 
international humanitarian law.”121  This special court is set up at the headquarters 
of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Freetown, Sierra Leone.  The 
special court of Sierra Leone is loosely based on the ICTY/ ICTR models, but was 
designed to differ from the Rwandan and Bosnian models in several ways.  
The hybrid court of Sierra Leone is a treaty based-court, and differs from the 
ICTR/Y in primacy, composition, subject matter jurisdiction, location, and 
efficiency.122  The Special Court will also have the full backing of the Sierra Leone 
government,123 which will ultimately facilitate its success.  The local support will 
be integral to the efficiency of the Sierra Leone court, as evidenced by the constant 
obstacles posed on the ICTR arising from the criticism by the Rwandan 
government and people.  
The first difference is the hybrid model can issue binding orders to the 
government of Sierra Leone, but unlike the ICTR/ ICTY, it will be unable to assert 
primacy over national courts of third states to order surrender of an accused.124
Secondly, this hybrid model is composed of both Sierra Leonean judges and 
120 See Michael P. Scharf, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, The American Society of International Law, available 
at www.asil.org/insights/insigh53.htm at page 1.
121 See Michael P. Scharf, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, The American Society of International Law, available 
at www.asil.org/insights/insigh53.htm at page 1.
122 See Michael P. Scharf, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, The American Society of International Law, available
at www.asil.org/insights/insigh53.htm at page 2.
123 See Michael P. Scharf, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, The American Society of International Law, available 
at www.asil.org/insights/insigh53.htm at page 3.
124 See Michael P. Scharf, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, The American Society of International Law, available 
at www.asil.org/insights/insigh53.htm at page 2.
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international judges.  The Government of Sierra Leone will appoint two judges, 
and the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan will appoint one judge.125  Thirdly, the 
subject matter of the special court will extend to encompass not only violations of 
international humanitarian law, but also certain crimes under Sierra Leonean law.  
The Special court will not have subject matter jurisdiction over the crime of 
genocide, unlike the ICTR/ ICTY.126  There was no evidence that the mass killing 
in Sierra Leone was against an identifiable national, ethnic, racial group with the 
intent to annihilate that group.127 Since the government of Sierra Leone asked for 
help from the U.N. if forming the special court, their compliance will surely help 
the process to move more quickly than the ICTY/R which each took more than two 
years to become fully operational.128
The hybrid model of Sierra Leone, infuses the local customs and laws of the 
domestic state with international law.  This special court was loosely based in the 
ICTR/Y, yet also took into account special circumstances behind its treaty-based 
inception, which gives it less U.N. power and backing than the ICTR/Y.  Hybrid 
courts such as the Sierra Leone model can strike a balance between domestic and 
international, and this court may be a model for other U.N. treaty-based courts in 
the future.         
125 See Michael P. Scharf, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, The American Society of International Law, available 
at www.asil.org/insights/insigh53.htm at page 2.
126 See Michael P. Scharf, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, The American Society of International Law, available 
at www.asil.org/insights/insigh53.htm at page 2.
127 See Michael P. Scharf, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, The American Society of International Law, available 
at www.asil.org/insights/insigh53.htm at page 2.
128 See Michael P. Scharf, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, The American Society of International Law, available 
at www.asil.org/insights/insigh53.htm at page 3.
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d. Cambodia   
A fourth hybrid tribunal is currently under negotiation between the United 
Nations and Cambodia.  The Cambodia court will be named the “Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.”  The U.N. has expressed grave concern 
regarding the numerous violations of human rights in Cambodia, which include: 
extra judicial executions, torture, rape, and lack of due process.129  There is special 
concern regarding the current judicial system of Cambodia and the reluctance and 
inability to charge members of the government and militia with violations of 
human rights.130
IV.  Appraisal 
As International Criminal Tribunals have evolved and blended international 
and domestic structures, more choices exist for countries looking to expand and 
reform their judiciary systems.  This era of international and domestic legal 
integration comes as a result of the increases in communication, diplomacy, 
democracy, and an inter-connected global economy.   
Iraqi Tribunal Founders evaluated the Ad-hoc models of the ICTY and 
ICTR, the ICC, and the hybrid models when forming their new judiciary.  By 
doing this preliminary research and appraisal, officials learned from historic 
lessons in this area in order to build-upon the setbacks and problems of the already 
existent tribunal models.   Learning from the previous successes and failures of 
129http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/ee74e24f4834b57a8025664800550026?Opendocument
130http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/ee74e24f4834b57a8025664800550026?Opendocument
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already established International Criminal Tribunals will potentially solidify a 
stable foundation for the Iraq Court.
V.  Recommendation
The founders of the new Iraqi Tribunal should weigh the attributes of each 
International Criminal Court model, and apply the rationale to their specific 
situation, much like the rationale behind the hybrid model.  In addition, tribunal 
officials should remain flexible as the volatility of the region lends itself to 
potential problems for this new judicial body.  Iraq should look to maintain a 
legitimate court, employ new laws, utilize international law as well as customary 
international law, and maintain a connection with the international legal 
community.   
Maintaining legitimacy will be important to the success of the New Iraqi 
Tribunal.  Hussein is a high-profile figure like Milosovic, and therefore the Iraqi 
founders can learn a great deal from the successes and failures of the ICTY.  The 
ICTY has set forth precedent, but the perceived legitimacy by the local people has 
been it’s greatest problem.  Since, the newly formed Iraqi Tribunal is being set up 
through a seemingly nepotistic connection (familial connection between head of 
congress and a former head of judiciary Salaam Chalabi), this has already posed a 
great threat to perceived legitimacy of the court as a puppet to United States 
interests.   In addition the legitimacy of the tribunal has also been questioned 
because its creator, Paul Bremer as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, 
33
selected the tribunals personnel and provided for it’s funding.131  This it is 
construed by some as a “victors’ tribunal.”132
The domestic location of the Iraq Court will be beneficial to maintaining 
economic efficiency, and to the establishment of a reformed court system.  The 
Iraqi founders have established the new court inside the borders of Iraq, and thus 
should not experience problems like the ICTY and ICTR regarding the great 
expenditures related to obtaining evidence and witnesses.  The Iraqi people will 
have to draft a new constitution, and update Iraqi’s criminal and commercial codes 
to ensure consistency with the needs of a modern democratic society and market 
economy.133
Since the Iraq court is set up in a post conflict setting, this mirrors a hybrid 
model in regards to location in the “place of the wrong.”  Since the tribunal will be 
comprised of Iraqi judges, this should help speed up the trial process, unlike the 
multi-national efficiency problems of the ICTR and ICTY.  Because the officials of 
the new court are all from Iraq there may be a balanced pay scale, which will also 
create a higher level of procedural efficiency.  However, the current hostility of 
insurgents is plaguing the Iraqi Tribunal and is a constant threat to all officials.  
Pentagon intelligence data shows an escalating insurgency, as each monthly peak 
in the number of violent incidents is followed by a higher average number of 
131
 Ved Nanda, Will Iraq tribunal be a success?, The Denver Post, Sunday, Feb. 20, 2005.
132
 Ved Nanda, Will Iraq tribunal be a success?, The Denver Post, Sunday, Feb. 20, 2005.
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violent attacks in subsequent months.134  The court should remain flexible and may 
need to move locations if the region increasingly becomes unstable to house a 
judiciary.  
In addition, the blending of local and international laws might cause 
complex problems to occur.  Human rights groups are warning that the court is 
already flawed, and Human Rights Watch points to the lack of protection of 
witnesses ad the failure to involve non-Iraqi prosecutors and investigative 
judges.135  Problems may arise if the local laws are not balanced properly with 
international laws:
“Where justice is purely local, on the other hand, the problem takes a 
slightly different form.  Local courts and local lawyers, unfamiliar with 
international standards, may seek to apply ordinary criminal law to the mass 
atrocities in question, even if the local law technically incorporates 
international humanitarian law.”136
The backing of the international community is necessary if crimes against 
humanity and war crimes are to be enforced in an international forum.  Since the 
international community could possibly take a back seat in the proceedings, as 
there are no international judges or prosecutors, problems may arise regarding 
international backing and enforcement of the new Iraqi Tribunal issued judgments.  
“In August 2003, a team of U.N. specialists concluded that Iraq had a 
degraded system that is not capable of rendering a fair and effective justice 
134
 From Reuters via the Australian Broadcasting Corporation available at http://www.command-
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for violations of international humanitarian law and other serious criminal 
offenses involving the prior regime.” 137
It is unapparent who will provide funding for the new Iraqi Court, and if the United 
Nations will back this court at all.  
Under Iraqi law, there is a statute specifying that Sadaam Hussein’s lead 
attorney needs to be an Iraqi.138  To defend him, Husseins’ family has selected 20 
lawyers out of nearly 600 who offered their services.139
The International Criminal Court was not a particularly feasible forum to try 
members of the former Iraqi regime.  In order to try Hussein at the ICC, either Iraq 
or the United States would need to be a member party to the Rome Treaty.  In 
addition, the ICC cannot issue a death sentence, and to the United States and Iraq 
this may be considered an unattractive and lenient punishment.  
In conclusion, the Iraqi Tribunal faces a long road towards legitimacy, 
permanency and complete formation.  This tribunal currently employs a domestic 
base, with some hybrid and ad-hoc additives.  The Iraq Tribunal wants to maintain 
purely domestic and become a permanent fixture in the new Iraq, however this will 
be an increasingly difficult task to obtain until the region is stable.  Ultimately, the 
court will need to maintain international ties, to reform laws, and learn from the 
successes and failures of the prior international tribunal models. 
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